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Citizenship in a financialised society:  
financial inclusion and the state before and after the crash 
 
Craig Berry 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this article is to interrogate the impact of financialisation on the evolving nature 
and practice of citizenship in the UK. Such an inquiry is necessary due to recent 
governments’ role in both responding to and facilitating the financialisation of individuals’ 
daily lives through changes in welfare provision and, in particular, the development of a 
‘financial inclusion’ agenda. This article also asks whether – and if so, how – the experience 
of the financial crisis of 2008 has modified the relationship between the financialisation 
process, the state and individuals in this regard. Although the terminology arrived later, the 
idea that public policy should be used to engender financial inclusion became established in 
the UK in the 1980s, and formed a significant aspect of New Labour’s agenda for 
government after 1997. Financial inclusion is typically understood as a development in UK 
welfare provision, given that it involved the innovative use of fiscal measures to ensure 
participation in aspects of the financial system. As many have pointed out, however, ‘asset-
based welfare’ was not simply a set of new fiscal policies, but part of the wider retrenchment 
of welfare provision in the UK, which saw the inculcation of expectations around home-
ownership to enable individuals to establish financial well-being and security for themselves 
without calling upon the welfare state (Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2014).  
The immediate context in which financial inclusion has been pursued is the apparent 
financialisation of UK society. Financial inclusion has invariably been presented as a 
progressive ‘response’ to financialisation, yet by increasing participation in the financial 
system, and subjecting greater numbers of people to risks associated with engaging with the 
financial system, financial inclusion also serves to advance the process of financialisation. 
Furthermore, and crucially, the financial inclusion agenda advances the financialisation of the 
state itself. Under the influence of a neoliberal macroeconomic policy framework, the state 
has sought to abdicate its role in shaping economic structures (which are deemed immutable), 
and instead developed a new role in regulating conduct within the economy, which includes 
enabling individuals to become self-reliant. Financial inclusion is constitutive of this process, 
in that it enables the ‘de-risking’ of the state, or more precisely, a particularistic de-risking of 
some welfare state institutions. Financial risks that might at one time have been shouldered 
by the state are instead ‘individualised’. There is a large and growing literature on 
financialisation located across the disciplines of political economy and economic geography. 
The dominant strain in this literature, that is, studies of both the economic power of the 
finance sector, and the focus on financial returns as a matrix for appraising economic 
performance, have more recently been supplemented by studies of the normative or cultural 
components of the financialisation process in reshaping individual behaviour (Christophers, 
2012; Epstein, 2006; Froud et al, 2007; Froud et al, 2010; Langley, 2004; 2008; Lapavitsas, 
2013; Leyshon & Thrift, 2009; Montgomerie, 2008; Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2014; van 
Treeck, 2009; van der Zwan, 2014). Generally speaking, both strains rightly identify 
financialisation as a global process, albeit one of particular significance for the UK, or more 
precisely, a process within which the UK is a key protagonist. As such, while the focus here 
is on the UK, this article maintains that it is vital to understand in greater depth how the UK 
interacts with financialisation in order to understand the process more generally. It is 
primarily the latter strain which has sought to account for the implications of financialisation 
for UK welfare provision (Finlayson, 2008; 2009; Langley, 2006; although see Watson 2009; 
2013a; 2013b for an effective synthesis). This literature generally presents the state therefore 
as an agent of financialisation, orchestrated through imbibing its traditional welfare functions 
with the logic of a financialised economy, therefore helping to rewrite cultural norms as well 
as reinforce the wider economic process. It is of course understandable, and welcome, that 
financialisation and the financial inclusion agenda have been assessed in terms of its impact 
on the principle and practice of welfare, yet there are clearly broader implications in terms of 
the function of the state in a financialised society (and polity), and therefore how the practice 
of citizenship has evolved in interaction with financialisation. This article’s contention, in 
short, is that this evolution cannot be interpreted as an automatic adjustment of the state to an 
external process of economic and spatial change. The normative or cultural turn in the 
literature on financialisation has deepened our understanding of the process in many ways, 
but does not necessarily offer a sophisticated understanding of the state’s role within this 
process. As such, the state’s enduring orientation – as an institution, or set of institutional 
practices – towards economic growth must be seen as underpinning the apparent reorientation 
of welfare provision. 
Financial inclusion cannot be understood unproblematically as a citizenship-derived 
entitlement. There is an enormous difference between participating in politics, and being 
included in the economy. Citizenship has evolved in recognition of this, as citizens have 
progressively been granted the right to protection (or insurance) by the state against the risks 
inherent in economic participation. To understand financial inclusion as straightforwardly 
representative of such a shift would be to imply that the risk against which citizens needed 
protecting was ‘financial exclusion’. We should not discount the problems created by lack of 
access to the financial system in a financialised society, but it must be acknowledged that 
being a full participant in financialised society, especially for some groups, poses inherent 
risks to well-being. It is vital that financial inclusion is assessed in terms of how the practice 
and meaning of citizenship has evolved more generally, from the bestowal of rights for 
political participation and, more recently, insurance against socio-economic risks, to a third 
major shift: proselytising about the responsibilities owed in return for such rights. This article 
argues therefore that financial inclusion should be seen as an exemplary form of 
‘responsibilisation’, in that it accompanies a greater need for self-reliance. Crucially, due to 
the persistence of the model of economic growth associated with financialisation (Hay, 
2013), the financial crisis appears not to have disrupted this pattern. Despite much anger, 
largely aimed directly at the City of London, there seems little appetite in British society for 
questioning whether the financial risks that individuals face could be prevented or alleviated 
through collective action. The causes of hardship have been individualised – and it is difficult 
to imagine the fundamentally social nature of risk being rediscovered while this growth 
model retains its attraction. 
This article offers a conceptual analysis of financial inclusion and citizenship, although 
it makes reference to recent and current public policy practice across several policy areas in 
order to elucidate the argument. By associating financialisation with the UK’s growth model 
– and crucially, the orientation of state institutions towards supporting this model – it both 
helps to explain the persistence of financial inclusion despite the financial crisis, and offers 
an original account of the evolving relationship between citizens and the state. The first 
section of this article outlines the process and implications of financialisation, arguing that it 
has not been disrupted – and may even have been intensified – by the financial crisis. 
Crucially, it associates the process, and persistence, of financialisation with the UK’s growth 
model, showing that financial inclusion forms part of a relatively novel regime for 
macroeconomic management. The second section explores in detail the use of public policy 
instruments to promote or facilitate financial inclusion, noting its origins under Margaret 
Thatcher’s premiership and showing how the agenda developed under New Labour into an 
‘asset-based welfare’ programme. This article follows Matthew Watson (2009), however, in 
recognising that the concept of asset-based welfare is relevant to elements of recent 
government’s economic statecraft far beyond the narrow confines of welfare provision, and 
therefore suggests that financial inclusion is in fact the more appropriate conceptualisation. 
The coalition government has abandoned some of the fiscal measures originally encompassed 
by the Labour agenda – yet the rationale for financial inclusion, to enable self-reliance, 
remains in place. The third section turns attention to the notion of citizenship. Building upon 
analysis of the responsibilisation of citizenship, it argues that financialisation intensifies the 
‘hollowing out’ of citizenship. Financial inclusion creates new risks, and can only be 
understood as an aspect of contemporary citizenship if we accept the state’s retreat from 
collectively mitigating socio-economic risks. The fourth section therefore introduces the 
concept of financial citizenship, as outlined by Andrew Leyshon (2009). It argues, however, 
that this is a largely fallacious notion which overlooks the risks of prevailing modes of 
financial inclusion. 
 
Financialisation and the UK’s growth model 
Generally speaking, the process of ‘financialisation’ began in the 1980s, in conjunction with 
both changes in the global economy, and the financial sector liberalisation agenda pursued by 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister. Although financialisation is often studied in terms of 
its impact on the UK, in practice the development of financialisation and the entrenchment of 
a neoliberal understanding of and approach to economic growth have to be seen as mutually 
constitutive. We can understand the core features of financialisation in terms of the increasing 
importance of financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions to the organisation 
of the economy (Epstein, 2006). Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift explain that 
financialisation has ‘agency at a range of scales’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 2009: 103). They 
emphasise the securitisation of consumer debt, transacted on global markets, as a key aspect 
of the individual experience of financialisation, but refer also to greater levels of systemic 
economic instability, and the enhanced role of capital markets in dictating attention to short-
term financial returns for both private corporations and public authorities. As noted in the 
Introduction, financialisation has taken on additional meanings, related to the imposition and 
experience of change at the individual level. Alan Finlayson describes financialisation as a 
‘realignment of the relationship between the individual and the global financial market’, 
expressed principally through new forms of pensions and credit, as well as the increase in the 
numbers of people with mortgages and equity-linked assets (Finlayson, 2009: 401; see also 
Finlayson, 2008). As such, the household or individual dimension has become increasingly 
important to analysis of financialisation. Paul Langley (2004) charts this change with 
reference to the concept being appropriated by cultural political economy, having originated 
in Marxism and regime theory as part of a meta-narrative signifying the shift from Fordist to 
post-Fordist capitalist organisation; on this reading, cultural political economy is a field in 
which the relationship between individual behaviour and embedded institutional and 
discursive practices is treated as a irreducible aspect of economic life. 
This article understands financialisation fairly expansively as a series of connected 
trends, including: firstly, the increased role and power of the finance sector in the economy; 
secondly a reorientation of private economic actors’ goals towards short-term financial 
returns; thirdly, a greater degree of interaction between individuals and financial services; 
and, fourthly, the personalisation of financial risks as collectivised financial mechanisms are 
dismantled. As importantly, however, it understands the significance of financialisation in 
terms of its relationship with the growth model which prevailed in the UK in the decades 
leading up to the financial crisis. Colin Crouch (2008) refers to this model as one of 
‘privatised Keynesianism’, a term applied specifically to New Labour, albeit with its origins 
identified in Margaret Thatcher’s premiership. For Crouch, the notion of a turn to monetarism 
in the late-1970s has been highly exaggerated. He argues that governments’ main concern 
remained managing demand; financialisation (and by association financial inclusion) was 
unleashed, however, as policy-makers looked to an expansion of private sources of credit, 
rather than fiscal policy, as the means to boosting consumer demand. Through privatised 
Keynesianism, the UK economy’s ‘dependence… on domestic consumption intensified rather 
than weakened’ – a scenario that might be considered counter-intuitive, especially from a 
neoliberal perspective, in an era of ‘globalisation’ (Crouch, 2008: 481). Globalisation mainly 
mattered to the privatised Keynesianism regime insofar as it reduced high-quality 
employment opportunities, and therefore earnings levels, for individuals, ultimately 
necessitating the growing incidence of unsecured debt for low-income (or ‘sub-prime’) 
customers, and innovative ways for the wealthy to manage their exposure to new financial 
risks. Financialisation therefore helped to solve, temporarily, ‘the great puzzle of the period’, 
that is, how a consumption-based economy can grow strongly while earnings stagnate 
(Crouch, 2008: 481).   
Colin Hay (2013) offers a slightly broader account of the UK’s pre-crisis growth model 
– he labels it ‘Anglo-liberal’ in recognition of the influence of the shift in classical liberalism, 
under the influence of neoclassical economics, towards neoliberalism. The Anglo-liberal 
growth model’s basic element was the use of debt and housing equity withdrawals to fund 
consumption. The liberalisation of credit markets and very low interest rates facilitated this 
process, but were also necessary to sustain its momentum. This situation had various 
implications, including increasing household indebtedness and a house price bubble; both 
introduced risks to individual well-being and economic stability, but could not be dampened 
without undermining consumption (Hay, 2013: 25). Clearly, the growth of the financial 
sector was integral to the model. Financial sector ‘innovation’ in fact enabled greater volumes 
of ‘sub-prime’ lending and high loan-to-value ratios, as debt obligations were securitised and 
traded, and high street banking was subsidised by the expansion of banks’ investment 
activities (Gamble, 2009: 16). Bank investment was primarily directed (ultimately) towards 
property rather than one might be understood as productive activity, and was itself largely 
enabled by the banks’ own debt-based business model (Hay, 2013: 27; Thompson, 2013; see 
also Casey, 2012 for a discussion of the relationship between financialisation, debt and the 
Anglo-liberal growth model). The services sector, more generally, became utterly dominant 
within the UK economy during this period. This is associated with the financialisation of 
corporate practice, which dictated that short-term financial returns were prioritised over long-
term investment, providing for a ‘low road’ business model adopted by many firms which 
incentivised concentration in labour-intense industries (characterised by low pay) with low 
barriers to entry in terms of capital investment (Berry, 2014). 
Acknowledging the relationship between financialisation and the Anglo-liberal or 
neoliberal growth model, as evident in the UK, helps to explain why financialisation has not 
been significantly disrupted by the financial crisis of 2008 – despite the fact that the crisis led 
to a severe economic slump. Firstly, the swift action of the Labour government to rescue the 
banking industry (the so-called ‘bailout’) both prevented the collapse of financial sector in 
the UK and reinforced the sense of a financial system that was both decoupled from 
democratic oversight and ineliminable from neoliberal growth, as the government believed it 
had little choice but to intervene in the way that it did (see Bowler, 2013; Brown, 2010). 
Secondly, both the nature of the coalition government’s austerity agenda, and even more so 
the rhetoric employed to justify this agenda, appears to further entrench aspects of 
financialisation. Clearly, it reinforces the need for individual self-reliance, albeit at least 
partly because our ability to rely on the state has been further undermined (Stanley, 2014). 
Austerity firmly applies the logic of financialisation to the management of public finances, as 
we are told that the UK must be able to ‘pay its way’ within the world. The cherishing of the 
UK’s triple-A status with the rating agencies epitomises this development; it was listed as a 
‘benchmark for Britain’ in the 2010 Conservative Party election manifesto. In short, austerity 
– fundamentally a product of the logic of financialisation – justifies the continuation of the 
neoliberal growth model in a post-crisis environment. The next section will argue, 
accordingly, that apparent differences between New Labour’s and the coalition’s financial 
inclusion agendas are fairly superficial. 
 
Financial inclusion and welfare provision 
Financial inclusion is understood here as the greater participation in financial activity of 
groups relatively excluded from the financial system – as such it is a policy agenda which 
applies most directly to low-income households. However, it should also be seen to signify 
the deeper participation of those already included. Both categories are centrally relevant to 
the statecraft, associated with financial inclusion, which is explored in this section. The story 
of financial inclusion and UK public policy should begin with the Thatcher government. In 
1986, Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) were introduced, offering special tax arrangements 
designed to encourage wider equity ownership, followed by Tax-Exempt Special Savings 
Accounts (TESSAs) in 1990 to encourage more people to save. However, neither initiative 
was successful in terms of integrating low-income households into the financial system 
directly (Jupp, 1997). Yet looking at these specific policies creates only a partial picture of 
the Thatcher government’s financial inclusion agenda. Indeed, Thatcher consistently stated 
that the creation of a ‘property-owning democracy’ (a recurring motif of Conservative Party 
rhetoric since the early twentieth century, but given greater prominence by Thatcher) was the 
chief objective of her policy programme. In 1987 she stated it as the main goal of her third 
term in office, but in fact had in 1975 already espoused its importance to her political 
philosophy in her maiden conference speech as party leader in 1975, attributing the concept 
to Anthony Eden (Francis, 2012: 275; Thatcher, 1975). Bestowing the ‘right to buy’ their 
homes on council tenants in 1980, and to a lesser extent employee share ownership schemes 
in privatised industries, are key examples of how the notion of financial inclusion illuminated 
the Thatcher government’s programme more generally. We can also see the deregulation of 
the financial services industry in the same way. Deregulation of the mortgage market assisted 
the widening of home-ownership, but just as importantly, the Thatcher government also 
deregulated the sale of personal pensions – that is, ‘defined contribution’ pensions, which 
individualise the risk of saving for a retirement income. Crucially, the fiscal incentives 
previously available only to ‘defined benefit’ pensions, where risks are shouldered by 
employers, were now also applied to defined contribution pensions (Morris & Palmer, 2011). 
To reiterate, in defined contribution provision, individuals’ outcomes are not guaranteed in 
advance, and instead depend on investment performance and, usually, annuity rates available 
when they reach retirement. 
Yet the strategic use of public policy interventions to engender financial inclusion is an 
agenda (and vocabulary) associated most appropriately with the New Labour governments of 
the late-1990s and 2000s. It is not implausible to suggest that financial inclusion was central 
to New Labour’s modernisation project, at least rhetorically, in that it enabled Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown to transpose a progressive intent upon the Labour Party’s quintessential 
accommodation to the neoliberal economic policy framework. Financialisation was not itself 
deemed pernicious – Blair and Brown were rarely reluctant to praise the value and ingenuity 
of financial institutions – and was encouraged on the basis that public policy could be used to 
mitigate certain exclusionary practices and enable the financial inclusion of greater numbers 
of people. The financial inclusion agenda therefore simultaneously both augmented and 
softened financialisation. In practice, however, virtually all of the elements of New Labour’s 
financial inclusion agenda – such as popularising equity investment, increasing incentives to 
save, and promoting both personal pensions and home-ownership – had been pioneered by 
the Thatcher government. 
Interestingly, the main application of the terminology of financial inclusion by New 
Labour related to an agenda that was fairly novel, that is, the creation of very simple financial 
products, designed for those for whom mainstream financial services were relatively 
inaccessible. Crucially, however, New Labour’s interventions in this area were not envisaged 
as an attempt to address financial exclusion for its own sake; rather, financial inclusion 
measures were perceived as a way to combat the more general problem of social exclusion. 
Lack of access to, and proficiency in, basic financial services problematised formal 
employment, and therefore fed into the processes by which individuals become distanced 
from mainstream cultural and economic life. New Labour also pioneered the direct payment 
of welfare payments into bank accounts, to incentivise engagement with financial services. 
Financialisation was not conceived as a cause of social exclusion, but rather a neutral and 
normal aspect of mainstream society. Basic bank accounts (BBAs) were introduced in 2003, 
in partnership with the retail banking sector, to enable poorer households to open less risky 
bank accounts – essentially to allow these groups to access the labour market. BBAs allow 
the deposit of wages and benefit payments automatically, direct debits to pay bills, and 
withdrawals at cash machines. But they have no overdraft facilities or cheque books, and 
limited debit card facilities. Similarly, with financial support from the government the Post 
Office introduced Post Office Card Accounts (POCAs) in the same year. BBAs and POCAs 
to some extent reflected the government’s opinion that the financially excluded are 
legitimately excluded by providers, given their higher risk profiles, meaning that less risky 
(although less functional) products will encourage providers to offer a more limited or 
‘particularistic’ form of financial inclusion (Midgeley, 2005). 
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to see New Labour’s financial inclusion agenda 
solely in these terms, or as an agenda that did not materialise as a policy objective until 2003. 
Individual Saving Accounts (ISAs) were introduced in 1999 to replace both PEPs and 
TESSAs (ISAs could be held in cash or equity). ISAs appear to have been more successful 
than their predecessors in increasing access to a simple, tax-efficient savings vehicle, 
although the extent to which they are utilised significantly by low earners is unclear (see HM 
Revenue and Customs, 2007). Labour’s first term also saw the introduction of ‘stakeholder 
pensions’, designed to offer a simple, low-cost pensions saving vehicle for low and moderate 
earners with little or no access to a workplace pension. Stakeholder pensions were 
exclusively personal or defined contribution pensions, and therefore the policy aimed to 
increase access to lower earners the novel, individualised form of pensions saving which first 
emerged in the 1980s. As with BBAs and ISAs, these were products offered privately by 
financial services providers, albeit in accordance with statutory regulations. Most employers 
were required to make a stakeholder pension product, or a suitable alternative, available to 
their staff. However, while many stakeholder pensions were established, it is not clear that 
they succeeded in encouraging low-earners to save more. Between 2001 and 2012, 
membership of stakeholder pensions gradually increased, but the proportion of employees 
actually saving in a workplace pension scheme fell from 55.3 per cent to 46.5 per cent – 
suggesting that stakeholder products helped to mitigate the declining popularity of traditional 
forms of pensions saving, but did not produce new savers (Office for National Statistics, 
2013). 
The centrality of pensions policy to New Labour’s financial inclusion initiatives is a 
clear sign that the agenda was designed, at least in part, to usher the financialisation of the 
state itself. Population ageing (even if the impact has been exaggerated or misrepresented in 
some ways) formed an explicit part of the public rationale for stakeholder pensions, as 
individuals were told they can no longer rely on the state to fund increasing periods of 
retirement (Department of Social Security, 1998). Importantly, stakeholder pensions also 
show that financial inclusion was concerned with both access for the excluded, and a more 
intimate form of financial participation for the already included: they sought to extend 
pensions saving (in practice, a form of direct investment in financial markets) to 
disadvantaged groups, but also to enable all individuals to build a complex financial asset, 
tying part of their retirement security to future investment returns. For Matthew Watson, 
Labour’s changes to pensions provision signify the real significance of financial inclusion: it 
was not simply about boosting financial participation, but rather to facilitate a form of 
privatised welfare, propelled by an image of ‘tension prone active worker-saver-investor 
subjects’ (Watson, 2013a). Watson suggests that interventions by New Labour to encourage 
private pensions saving were the key element of what several commentators have termed 
‘asset-based welfare’, which he defines as a turn ‘away from the passive receipt of state-
provided welfare services and towards active management of assets through which 
individuals become personally responsible for releasing future income streams when welfare 
needs demand they do so’ (Watson, 2009: 42). 
Given the failure of stakeholder pensions to meaningfully increase pension scheme 
membership, New Labour essentially abandoned the policy in 2006 (although products are 
still available) when the independent Pensions Commission reported that requiring employees 
to ‘opt in’ to pensions saving was unlikely to succeed (see Pensions Commission, 2006). In 
place of stakeholder pensions came ‘personal accounts’. The Commission – established with 
cross-party support – outlined plans for compulsion on all employers to establish a workplace 
pension scheme and make contributions to employees’ pensions above a certain level. 
Crucially, employees would be automatically enrolled into a scheme, with the option of 
opting out; those opting out would be re-enrolled after three years, or when they changed 
jobs. New Labour accepted the Commission’s proposals almost verbatim, although the notion 
of state-provided personal accounts gave way to the creation of a government-sponsored, 
defined contribution, multi-employer pension provider (the National Employment Savings 
Trust, or NEST), and statutory rules to ensure that other providers (which would maintain the 
vast majority of the pensions saving market) adhered to standards similar to those upheld by 
NEST when offering schemes for automatic enrolment, with the crucial exception of 
independent scheme governance. After a short review the coalition government decided to 
take forward New Labour’s plans, with automatic enrolment enforceable, and NEST 
operational, from late 2012. 
There were a number of more narrowly-defined interventions by New Labour in this 
area. The Child Trust Fund (CTF), introduced in 2005 (and back-dated to September 2002), 
was the most prominent of these. Through this scheme, children were awarded £250 at birth 
and a further £250 at age seven (children from low-income families received £500 at both 
points), with the intention that parents would top up the funds, which were held as cash or in 
low-risk equity products with tax-free growth. The fund would become an asset for the child 
upon reaching eighteen; it was hypothesised that possession of the asset would help to mould 
the way individuals think and behave – making them more responsible and ultimately 
productive – and in particular help to ease the transition between adolescence and adulthood, 
enabling greater self-reliance for young people (Nissan and Le Grand, 2000). However, we 
should not overstate the significance of schemes such as the CTF. Alan Finlayson (2008) has 
charted how the CTF became much less ambitious in scope as it journeyed from idea to 
implementation, with assumptions about the extent of behavioural change it would engender 
taking on a central role in the rationale, to some extent displacing the desire to help young 
people develop a financial asset. 
New Labour’s vision for financial inclusion as a route to well-being was epitomised, 
above all, by its attempt to help individuals to enter and traverse the housing market. The 
Labour government went much further, however, than simply establishing a ‘right to buy’ for 
social housing tenants (which had been a key agenda of the Thatcher government). Two key 
shifts are evident in this regard: firstly, housing was transformed from a universal right, 
which the state was obliged to strive to uphold, to a vehicle for private investment gains. 
Secondly, the state’s role in relation to housing was transformed from ‘direct securing of 
distinct patterns of housing tenure’ to ‘securing a macroeconomic environment in which 
mortgage lending conditions produce continual upward pressure on housing prices’ (Watson, 
2009: 47-48). As such, widening access to credit and maintaining low interest rates, 
ostensibly features of monetary policy rather than fiscal policy – and certainly never 
conceived as aspects of the welfare state – were decisive elements of New Labour’s welfare 
agenda. Alongside macroeconomic stability in general, both were consistently and 
systematically pursued, providing, as Colin Hay argues, ‘both the incentive and the 
opportunity for first-time buyers to enter a rising housing market and for established home-
owners to extend themselves financially, by either moving up the housing ladder, or releasing 
the equity in their property to fuel consumption’ (Hay, 2013: 26). On this issue, Hay 
concludes that ‘[a]sset-based welfare was, in effect, a way of mortgaging the future capacity 
of citizens to provide for themselves with dignity on the vagaries of the housing market’ 
(2013: 29). Through its multi-faceted support for housing investment, across all segments of 
the market, New Labour seemingly strengthened the process of financialisation by 
encouraging more people to take on investment risks. It also helps to reinforce the crucial 
point that asset-based welfare is not simply about new fiscal measures taking the place of 
traditional welfare-style interventions; it is about the inculcation of responsibility  
Given the relationship between housing market gains and consumption, it is clear that 
asset-based welfare was focused far more on enabling spending rather than increasing saving, 
and as such this agenda represents ‘the social policy corollary of Anglo-liberal growth’ (Hay, 
2013: 26). Pensions saving is a misleading exception in this regard, given that pensions do 
not substitute consumption, but rather defer it. It is worth noting that New Labour had of 
course proposed ‘the Saving Gateway’ at the same time as the CTF; available only to people 
in receipt of certain means-tested benefits, including in-work benefits, through the Saving 
Gateway the government would add 50p to basic savings accounts for every £1 saved by 
account holders over a two-year period. A maximum of £25 could be paid in each month, and 
only new savings would be rewarded (that is, only funds that exceed the previous month’s 
final balance). However, despite two successful pilot projects, the Saving Gateway was never 
introduced – postponed by the Brown government and abandoned by its successor. The 
scheme was, in any case, available only to the very poorest groups within society, that is, 
those highly unlikely to become home-owners. 
The main problem with the notion of asset-based welfare, however, is that it is not 
really ‘welfare’ at all: it is both more and less. As noted above, the term signifies an 
expansive agenda which utilises a wide range of policy interventions in support of a given 
growth model. At the same time, however, the agenda is not focused on maintaining or 
adapting collective forms of protection against risk, but rather displacing ultimate 
responsibility for welfare to the individual level. This understanding of welfare sees it as a 
corollary of citizenship, or more precisely, ‘social citizenship’, the notion that citizens have 
the right to be protected against a range of socio-economic risks, as well as the right to 
participate in the political processes of society. In the case of automatic enrolment into a 
private pension, we see the state not only partially abdicating its role in provide for older 
people’s welfare in retirement, but also (softly) compelling us to become financially included, 
or more intimately financially included, whether we like it or not. 
Before discussing the implications of such shifts for citizenship, it is worth reflecting 
briefly here on changes undertaken by the coalition government across these areas. The key 
policy change introduced by the coalition government initially was the abandonment of any 
significant fiscal support for general saving, beyond the continuation of ISAs. The CTF was 
immediately discontinued (albeit replaced by junior ISAs, available on much less generous 
terms than ‘adult’ ISAs), and plans for the Saving Gateway aborted. Automatic enrolment, in 
contrast, retained support, despite costing far more than the CTF or Saving Gateway (in 
additional pensions tax relief expenditure). Clearly, these changes can be explained, in part, 
by unwillingness from the coalition to fund progressive fiscal measures in support of 
financial inclusion. In fact, despite largely proceeding with Labour’s plans, the coalition has 
introduced an ‘earnings trigger’ for automatic enrolment, linked to the fast-rising income tax 
personal allowance, meaning may low-paid workers are not automatically entitled to an 
employer contribution into their pension, as originally envisaged (see DWP, 2010). Generally 
speaking, measures to support pensions saving have been retained and strengthened. In 
enabling welfare retrenchment, such measures accord with the financialisation of the state. At 
the same time, measures to support general saving have been withdrawn. While ostensibly 
aimed at delivering self-reliance through financial inclusion, such measures arguably also 
create new welfare-based risks for the state. For the coalition, self-reliance is best inculcated 
by welfare state withdrawal, not the enabling state. The necessity for individuals to be 
financially included is unchanged. 
Such an orientation is consistent with the coalition’s economic strategy, which depends 
upon private household consumption, funded by increased indebtedness. The OBR says that 
private consumption will be contributing almost two-thirds of GDP growth by 2017 – at a 
time of stagnant earnings, this simply cannot be sustained without relatively high levels of 
consumer borrowing (OBR, 2013). As under New Labour, the coalition government has 
identified a buoyant housing market as central to this agenda, and as such through the 
appointment of Mark Carney of the governor of the Bank of England has sought to ensure a 
sustained period of very low interest rates. As expected, Carney quickly replicated the 
‘forward guidance’ he first implemented as Governor of the Bank of Canada, meaning that 
interest rates will remain low until certain economic conditions (principally a low 
unemployment rate) are met; these conditions were in fact relaxed in 2014, allowing interest 
rates to remain low indefinitely, after unemployment fell more quickly than anticipated. 
Furthermore, the Funding for Lending (FFL) scheme has enabled banks and building 
societies to borrow money at very low rates from the Bank of England, providing it is loaned 
out again to businesses or consumers – the scheme is widely credited with driving down 
mortgage rates (the Bank subsequently altered FFL to concentrate on business lending). 
Perhaps most significantly, the government has introduced the Help to Buy (HTB) scheme – 
a deliberate echo of Margaret Thatcher’s ‘right to buy’ – through which buyers of new-build 
homes can take out a loan from the government of up to 20 per cent of the value of the 
property, if they are able to contribute 5 per cent, in place of a deposit. Crucially, HTB also 
enables banks to insure the risk of offering mortgages with high loan-to-value ratio. The 
scheme was expanded in late 2013, and subsequently extended to 2020.  
FFL and particularly HTB actually involve the state taking on new, and significant, 
fiscal risks, even though neither has been described in these terms. This does not 
problematise the notion that the state has been financialised, but rather demonstrates that it is 
a means to an end: the state will ‘invest’ in the housing market insofar as it facilitates the 
resurrection of a pre-crisis growth model, but is no longer willing to insure citizens against 
the risk of hardship to the same extent. Financial inclusion has always encompassed efforts to 
deepen the engagement with the financial system – involving greater risks – of the already 
included, as well include the currently excluded. Under the coalition government, the balance 
is now weighed towards the former. The coalition is less interested in progressive fiscal 
interventions, and greater support for the housing market is required to resurrect the growth 
model. It may also be the case, however, that the financialisation of everyday life, even for 
those with very low incomes, is largely complete, irrespective of the abandonment of 
measures such as the Saving Gateway. As such, while the coalition champions the 
dismantling of New Labour’s approach to welfare, significant continuities are evident. 
Indeed, it is plausible to conclude that the coalition’s own agenda would not be possible 
without the foundations laid by its predecessor, not least in reframing the notion of 
citizenship, as the next section explores. 
 
The hollowing out of citizenship 
Generally speaking, citizenship in Western countries like the UK has proceeded from the 
establishment of ‘political’ rights to a wider conception of social citizenship, or the right to be 
insured against certain risks. This pattern has, however, seemingly gone into reverse. As an 
aspect of citizenship, financial inclusion implies that the state is protecting citizens from the 
risk of financial exclusion. However, financial inclusion has far more often been articulated 
in relation to new responsibilities, than as a set of new citizenship-derived entitlements. A 
state that enables individuals to take part in the economy may be welcome insofar as it 
implies assistance for disadvantaged groups to participate in the economy on a more 
equitable basis. But this appears to have been only a marginal aspect of the financial 
inclusion agenda; moreover, even this ambition has been marginalised in the hands of the 
coalition government.  
Financial inclusion fits, therefore, with the third major shift in the evolution of 
citizenship, that is, ‘responsibilisation’. Conditionality for benefit entitlements, for instance, 
has always been a feature of welfare provision, and certainly took on greater significance 
under the Thatcher government. But it is under the New Labour government that the notion 
of responsibilisation first emerged. The basic argument is that policy-makers’ understanding 
of citizenship has more to do with establishing responsibilities for rights that we already 
have, rather than rights in return for responsibilities imposed by socio-economic structures. 
Responsibilisation essentially reverses the basic logic of how citizenship has developed for 
decades. For John Clarke (2011), New Labour upheld three overlapping versions of 
citizenship: firstly, the activated citizen, making contributions to society principally through 
work. Secondly, the empowered citizen, endowed with choice not simply through formal 
electoral processes but also in relation to the provision of public services. New Labour’s third 
version of citizenship, according to Clarke, involved the responsibilised citizen. 
Responsibility has always been central to citizenship, but New Labour went further in 
defining acceptable behaviour as individuals taking responsibility for themselves, in the 
process forgoing the resources they were ultimately entitled to from the welfare state. 
Accounts of the responsibilisation of citizenship, however, often overlook the economic 
context in which this shift has occurred. Yet responsibilisation takes the particular form it has 
taken as the meaning and practice of citizenship interacts with the process of financialisation. 
The growth of the financial sector and amplification of financial motives, for instance, is the 
immediate context in which defined contribution pensions have grown in importance; these 
products require individuals to take greater risks, or in other words, take responsibility for 
their own retirement security. Similarly, the responsibility to engage with the housing market 
is inescapably bound up with the neoliberal growth model associated with financialisation. 
More generally, responsibilisation at the individual level means fewer mechanisms of 
collective responsibility – responsibilisation therefore facilitates the financialisation of the 
state.  
 
The fallacy of ‘financial citizenship’? 
Andrew Leyshon, whose work with Nigel Thrift on financialisation was discussed above, 
argues there has emerged a new form of citizenship, namely ‘financial citizenship’, 
appropriate to the risks faced in a financialised society. In the International Encyclopaedia of 
Human Geography, Leyshon defines financial citizenship as ‘a concept that recognises the 
significance of the financial system to everyday life and confers a right and ability on 
individuals and households to participate fully in the economy and to accumulate wealth’ 
(2009: 153). Accordingly, efforts to increase financial inclusion flow naturally in the same 
way that, for instance, unemployment benefits or state pensions flow naturally from the 
notion of social citizenship. Leyshon of course recognises that many people are financially 
excluded, and in fact concludes, crucially, that only the ‘super-included’ truly experience 
financial citizenship (2009: 156).  
Judged on its own terms, Leyshon’s logic is essentially sound. Financialisation requires 
a new form of citizenship, which has not yet been attained by all. However, the conflation of 
financial citizenship with financial inclusion or participation in the financial system heralds 
several, critical questions. Firstly, it seems to take no account of the responsibilisation of 
citizenship. Leyshon assumes that new forms of welfare provision posited as a response to 
financialisation represent an organic extension of social citizenship, rather than a way of 
reinforcing the inculcation of responsibilities inherent in the broader financial inclusion 
agenda. In contrast to Leyshon’s view, therefore, in an important sense we are all financial 
citizens, irrespective of our relative inclusion or exclusion from the financial system – 
because we all have the responsibility to seek inclusion, helped only partially by limited 
fiscal measures under the guise of asset-based welfare. Secondly, related to this, and as 
argued above, financial inclusion creates new risks at the individual level which cannot be 
meaningfully mitigated by individuals themselves. Tolerating risk therefore becomes a 
defining aspect of everyday life.  
Thirdly, financialisation can be associated not only with the weakening of social 
citizenship, but also the right of citizens to participate in political life. Paradoxically, although 
the recapitalisation of UK banks in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008 may, on the one 
hand, be seen as consistent with our rights, as citizens, to protection by the state from certain 
economic risks, it is undoubtedly the case that the Labour government’s actions in this regard 
were undertaken without democratic oversight. There is an important question about whether 
financialisation, insofar as it ensures the economy’s dependence on the financial sector, is 
impervious to democracy. Interestingly, in the citizenship education programme introduced 
by New Labour, while issues around personal finances are part of the curriculum for pupils 
aged between five and eleven, when the emphasis is on young citizens developing ‘life 
skills’, finance is conspicuous by its absence from the curriculum for older pupils, when the 
emphasis turns to political participation and critical thinking. The implication is that 
financialisation is something for citizens to come to terms with, but not challenge through 
democratic processes (Berry & Serra, 2012; see also Lawrence, 2014). 
In practice, it seems unlikely that financialisation can be socialised. Democratic 
oversight of financial processes would fundamentally contradict financialisation, in that it 
would invariably subject such processes to evaluation by non-financial criteria. We could 
instead expect the finance sector to be more stringently regulated, in a technocratic sense, to 
minimise the threat of collapse (and the dire consequences for society that would follow); of 
course, such change is already evident to some extent, although the scope of post-crisis 
regulatory reform has been limited. At the individual level, the state already offers a degree 
of consumer protection in relation to financial products, generally at the point of sale. Yet a 
more expansive notion of financial citizenship would surely require it to establish insurance-
style guarantees against downside risks. Most bank deposits are of course already fully 
protected by the state, but there are few signs that such protection would be extended to more 
complex financial products such as mortgages and pensions. The crucial issue, however, is 
not whether such changes should occur, but rather whether it is conceivable that they might. 
Essentially, to redraw the boundaries between state and citizens in this fashion would require 
a transformation of the model of economic growth within which financialisation is a central 
component. If the financial crisis did not inspire such a transformation, it is hard to imagine it 
occurring in the foreseeable future; as such, the persistence of the financial inclusion agenda 
in public policy is indicative of the limited possibilities for citizenship in relation to the 
neoliberal state. 
 
Conclusion 
The implications of financialisation and the financial inclusion agenda for welfare provision 
and individual well-being have been studied in depth by both political economists and 
economic geographers. This article has built upon insights from scholarship on 
financialisation which focuses on economic and spatial change, and that which focuses on 
cultural and behavioural change, to offer a more thorough exploration of what the pursuit of 
financial inclusion tells us about the nature and functions of the state. In studying the role of 
the transformation of welfare provision in inculcating new social norms around well-being 
and responsibility, the latter literature places the state at the centre of analysis. However, the 
literature on financialisation and welfare to date has tended to represent the state as an agent 
for merely transmitting the logic of structural socio-economic change into the realm of 
individuals’ everyday lives. To better understand the nature of the state’s role in the process 
of financialisation, we need to understand the state as an institution or set of institutional 
practices. As such, it is the orientation of the state towards an Anglo-liberal or privatised 
Keynesian growth model which has necessitated the reorientation of the relationship between 
individuals and the state, with concomitant implications for how welfare is conceived of and 
supported by public authorities, as successive governments’ economic strategies have 
interacted with financialisation in various ways – including facilitating financialisation as a 
means to delivering economic growth.  
It is in this context that efforts to enhance financial participation at the individual level 
raise profound questions about citizenship. From the early twentieth century onwards, the 
welfare state offered novel protections to individuals against socio-economic risks, propelled 
by the notion of social citizenship. But in recent decades, citizenship has become 
‘responsibilised’ as the states inculcates into everyday life the need for greater self-reliance. 
Financialisation is the economic context, often overlooked, within which this transformation 
has occurred. The emerging notion of financial citizenship, however, is insufficient to 
mitigate the threat to a traditional conception of citizenship represented by financialisation, or 
indeed to offer a cogent conceptual framework for appreciating the state’s responsibilities for 
welfare provision in a financialised society. The right to be included in political life is a 
definitive aspect of citizenship, yet is not commensurate with a right to participate in the 
(financialised) economy, if inclusion in this regard is not accompanied by forms of protection 
against financial risks. This threat of financialisation to citizenship is compounded by the 
financialisation of the state, and furthermore, the apparent curtailment of the state’s 
willingness to submit efforts to support the financial system – for instance, banking sector 
recapitalisation – to democratic processes. Crucially, we cannot assume that the meaning and 
practice of citizenship is isolated from the economic imperatives to which the state is 
increasing oriented – the custodians of our citizenship-based duties and entitlements and the 
purveyors of macroeconomic management are one and the same. 
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